ABSTRACT With the sharp increase in mobile apps, modular design and functional reuse are commonly adopted. The inter-component communication (ICC) mechanism in Android allows apps to exchange data with other apps and components, resulting in large amounts of security issues, such as component hijacking vulnerabilities, privilege escalation and spoofing attacks. Although ICC has been extensively studied in previous work, none of the previous approaches is practically scalable to simultaneously analyze a large number of Android apps, giving the combinational explosion of possible inter-component (and inter-app) communications. In this paper, we first propose an explorative study to analyze the ICC-based interaction for a large amount of Android apps. Then we propose CRSPR, a PageRank-like topic-aware app ranking approach to highlight influential Android apps for ICC analysis. The experimental results show that CRSPR is better than the basic counting approach as well as the traditional PageRank-based approach, which further demonstrate that CRSPR is useful for highlighting influential Android apps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, the rapid development of smartphone has led to a sharp increase of Android apps. For example, the number of Android apps in Google Play has surpassed the two million mark in 2016 [1] with billions of downloads [2] . The huge success of Android has made it a primary target of hackers, who are now developing mobile malware at an industrial scale [3] .
The big success of Android can be explained by many reasons. One of them could be the inter-component communication (ICC) mechanism provided by the Android system. The idea of ICC is to promote the development of loosely-coupled apps and thus to reuse existing functionalities whenever it is possible, where each functionality is usually implemented by a component, the basic unit forming Android apps. When a functionality is implemented and installed on a device (with the installation of its app), other apps can then integrate it into their apps to fulfill their functionalities, like they have implemented that functionality by themselves. As an example, let us assume that a developer wants to implement an app with a functionality to make phone call. Since this functionality is already implemented by a system app shipped with the device, the developer does not need to re-implement that functionality any more but can simply reuse the existing one. 1 Fig. 1 presents an overview of the basic concepts of Android apps [5] . As shown in Fig. 1 , Android apps are made up of components and there are in total four types of components:
A. MOTIVATION FOR ICC MECHANISM
• Activity is responsible for the visible part (i.e., the graphic user interface) of Android apps. • Service is used to execute time-intensive tasks in the background.
• Broadcast Receiver waits to receive user/system events, so as to execute the pre-defined functionalities.
• Content Provider plays as a standard data interface that allows other components/apps to access. Android components can actually communicate with each other, e.g., from Activity to Service in App1 in Fig. 1 . This communication is referred by the literature as intercomponent communication (ICC) . There are two types of ICC supported by the Android system: (1) explicit ICC, where the target component is specifically set and (2) implicit ICC, where the target component is not explicitly set but is specified by some meta information such as Action, Category. For implicit ICC, the final communication is then determined by the Android system that searches in the installed apps for all the possible target components, either within the same app or from different apps. If the target component is from a different app, the communication is then referred by the literature as inter-app communication (IAC), e.g., from Broadcast Receiver in App1 to InFlowActivity in ActivityCommunication3 in Fig. 1 .
If we consider each component as a node and each ICC as an edge, the overall ICCs of a set of Android apps can be represented as a directed graph, which is usually referred by literatures as an ICC graph. For example, Fig. 1 can be taken as an ICC graph that contains six nodes and five edges, among two apps. As we introduced, because of implicit ICC, a component can communicate with many target components while similarly can also be reached by many source components. With the rapid increase of the number of Android apps, this feature may result in a huge ICC graph that is practically impossible for any existing approach to resolve (the so-called scalability problem). Therefore, in this work, we propose to prioritize influential Android apps for preferential analysis through a topic-aware PageRank-like app ranking approach.
B. SECURITY ISSUES INTRODUCED BY ICC
Despite that ICC has brought lots of advantages for facilitating the development of Android apps, recent studies also suggest that it can bring amounts of security issues as well. Examples of such security threats include component hijacking vulnerabilities [6] , intent spoofing attacks [7] , and app collusion attacks [8] - [10] , etc. Those ICC-induced vulnerabilities (or attacks) strongly demonstrate that there is a need to perform security analysis on the usage of Android ICC. Indeed, state-of-the-art work has proposed various approaches to explore this direction [11] - [15] .
For example, Octeau et al. introduced a tool named IC3 to automatically infer the target values of Android ICCs [11] . Based on resolved ICCs, several approaches including IccTA were proposed to detect inter-component privacy leaks [15] .
Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned approaches is practically scalable to simultaneously analyze large amounts of Android apps, giving the combinational explosion of possible inter-component (and inter-app) communications. Several existing work, including PRIMO [12] and SIFTA [16] , attempted to reduce the final ICC combinations to support scalable ICC analyses. Those approaches, however, can only be applied to mitigate the severity of the scalability problem of ICC analysis. They cannot be leveraged to entirely resolve the scalability problem of ICC analysis. With the rapid increase of Android apps, we believe that it is extremely difficult to invent an approach that is capable of analyzing at the same time all the existing apps (or at least for all the apps belonging to the same market). Therefore, in this work, we propose to prioritize the importance of Android apps for security analysis, where the most important apps (i.e., influential apps such as the one that is accessed by thousands of other apps) can be preferentially analyzed.
C. OUR WORK
To this end, we present in this work a novel approach called CRSPR 2 , a PageRank-like topic-aware app ranking approach, to highlight influential Android apps for ICC analysis. The reasons why we apply CRSPR to rank Android apps are: (1) comparing to basic counting approach (baseline), where such apps that have higher number of communicated apps are ranked preferentially, CRSPR is able to mitigate the impact of isolated apps, which only recurrently appear in a small set of apps (e.g., an isolated small ICC graph) but are not appearing globally. Basically, CRSPR considers not only the number of communications but also the quality of each communication; (2) comparing to basic PageRank approach, where the number of ICC communications as well as the quality of each communication are considered, CRSPR further considers the topic of Android apps. Topic information is important for CRSPR because for security analysis some types of apps such as finance apps are more critical than others.
To evaluate the effectiveness of CRSPR, we have implemented a prototype system called CRSDroid and applied it to more than 91 thousand real-world Android apps collected from Google Play and 40 third-party markets. The experimental results show that CRSPR is better than the basic counting approach (baseline) as well as the PageRank-based approach, which further demonstrate that CRSPR is useful for highlighting influential Android apps.
To summarize, this paper makes the following research contributions:
• We have analyzed the inter-component communications of more than 91 thousand Android apps (more than 1 million components) and built a huge ICC graph.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work that analyzed the inter and intra connection between apps in such a large scale. To improve the accuracy of ICC analysis, we have extended IC3 to improve analysis for the content provider by tackling more Android APIs that can affect Intent values, especially URI values, and resolving more static data in resource files.
• We have proposed a novel app ranking approach based on the inter-component (and inter-app) communications, which could be used to identify the influential apps from the ICC graph. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work that ranks apps based on the interaction relationship, especially considering the security importance of apps.
• We analyzed the influential apps, and provided both quantitative and qualitative analysis to show how these apps could affect other innocent apps. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The interaction model, the workflow and implementation techniques are proposed in Section II. Section III explains our PageRanklike topic-aware app ranking algorithm. Section IV shows our experiments and results, and gives further analysis on our findings. Limitations of our approach are discussed in Section V. We review related works in Section VI, and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. CONSTRUCTING THE ICC GRAPH
We first show how we extract ICC interaction relationship and how we construct the ICC graph. Fig. 2 shows the overall workflow of our approach.
For each app, we first identify the third-party libraries (TPLs) used in them. TPLs are widely used in Android apps. Previous work [17] suggested that more than 60% of the code belongs to TPLs. TPLs will be identified as main functionalities of the app if they are not accurately marked, causing inaccuracy in ICC analysis. Thus we use a clustering-based approach to identify TPLs. To construct the ICC graph, we have designed an ICC extractor, including a declaration extraction module (DEM) and an invocation extraction module (IEM 
A. IDENTIFYING THIRD-PARTY LIBRARIES
In general, TPLs are used without modification by developers. Thus, the code belongs to TPLs should be clustered into big clusters because the same TPLs can be used by different apps. This is the main idea of clustering-based approaches.
We extract features at package level for a large number of apps and then cluster these features into groups. The code that belongs to TPLs is supposed to be clustered into big groups. Our approach is resilient to obfuscation because the features that we used (APIs, Intents, Content Providers, etc.) do not depend on package names or variable names in the code. Furthermore, we are also able to detect different versions of TPLs (including obfuscated ones) without prior knowledge.
B. ICC DECLARATION ANALYSIS
In general, components must be declared in AndroidManifest.xml when they need to be accessed. We construct an eight-dimension feature vector for each ICC declaration, including target Type, target Package, target Class, action, category, uri.scheme, uri.authority and uri.path.
The DEM, integrating IC3 [11] , Dare [18] and Androidapktool [19] , is used to extract static declarations of components from AndroidManifest.xml, and analyze dynamic declarations of components from the DEX bytecode to construct the complete declaration set. We extract the following information:
• Third-party components used in the app; • • Permissions declared in AndroidManifest.xml.
• Components dynamically declared in classes.dex; IC3 is an ICC analysis tool that relies on the COAL solver, which is a multi-valued composite constant propagation solver [20] . We use IC3 to extract the ICC declaration information. The solver infers all possible values of complex objects in an inter-procedural, flow-sensitive and contextsensitive manner. All essential information in AndroidManifest.xml (components, intent-filters, etc.) can be acquired by IC3 efficiently. Dynamic declared components in classes.dex can be acquired precisely as well.
C. ICC INVOCATION ANALYSIS
Apps can invoke exposed components and get access to their data. We construct a nine-dimension feature vector for each ICC invocation, including sourceClass, desType, desPkg, desComponent, action, category,uri.scheme, uri.authority, and uri.path. We extract the following information: Therefore, IC3 can analyze some parts of the essential information, including invocation APIs, intents and URIs. However, previous work [21] suggested that IC3 is insufficient in the aspect of identifying comprehensive invocation APIs. For example, PackageManager.queryIntentServices is used to retrieve services matching given intents, and URIMatcher.-addURI is used to retrieve URIs matching given strings. But these APIs are ignored in IC3. Besides, IC3 cannot handle cases that backtracking parameters are put into resource files. For example, apps can use APIs (getString, etc.) with hexadecimal parameters to obtain the actual values from string.xml. But IC3 does not attempt to track these values.
Aiming at the limitations of IC3, we designed the IEM to analyze comprehensive invocations of apps, by consummating the invocation set. We optimize IC3 in the following aspects:
• The IEM observes more invocation APIs, including addURI and queryIntentServices, to retrieve more integrate invocations.
• When backtracking parameters of invocation APIs, if the parameters are represented with hexadecimal addresses, the IEM tries to resolve strings and values in specified resource files.
• To construct the ICC interaction graph, the IEM makes further improvements on IC3, focusing on associations between source and target components, instead of just those between Intent instances and target components, by calculating where Intent instances are referred.
D. CONSTRUCTING THE ICC GRAPH
The inter-component association is a relationship from the invocation set to the declaration set. To construct the ICC graph, we compare the elements in both invocation set and declaration set. As shown in Table 1 , ICC declaration and ICC invocation are matched only when they fulfill one of the following three conditions:
• The feature vector <desType, desPkg, desComponent> of an element in the invocation set is identical to the vector <targetType, targetPkg, targetClass> of an element in the declaration set.
• The feature vector <action, category> of an element in the invocation set is identical to that in the declaration set.
• The feature vector <uri.scheme, uri.authority> of an element in the invocation set is identical to that in the declaration set. For example, if the invocation API is startActivity, then the type of target component is Activity, and the association between the source and target components could be determined only when one of the following three features is figured out: 1) desClass; 2) intent action; 3) scheme and authority.
Based on these associations, we construct the ICC interaction graph in terms of the following rules: 
III. PAGERANK FOR ANDROID APPS A. INTRODUCTION TO PAGERANK
PageRank is an algorithm to measure the relative importance of ranking pages based on mutual votes between page nodes [22] . The rank of a node is determined by nodes that linked to this node. In order to avoid instability due to isolated nodes (also called dangling points), a random walk coefficient is added into the propagation of rank. The coefficient VOLUME 5, 2017 represents the probability of jumping to a random irrelevant node, instead of the expected ones according to the transition matrix. Assuming the coefficient is α, then the probability of jumping to an irrelevant node is 1 − α. With the coefficient, each node can get votes from all nodes equally.
However, it is not feasible to directly apply PageRank to the ICC interaction graph. PageRank is not topic-sensitive, which means that it does not care about the weight between adjacent nodes [23] . Thus, during the iterative computation, the rank values of nodes are equally distributed to successors, resulting in unreasonable consequences. For instance, a component may distribute the same rank value to payment and UI components, while they should not occupy the same importance.
B. CRSPR: COMPONENT RELATIONSHIP-BASED PAGERANK
To overcome the aforementioned limitation of PageRank, we propose CRSPR, a Component RelationShip-based PageRank approach, to highlight influential Android apps considering both intrinsic and topic weights. We use the extended activation force to measure the strength between each pair of adjacent components. Assuming one component is attracted by the force generated by all the adjacent ones. The weight reflects the proportion to the resultant of force. The larger force an adjacent component generates, the greater weight it gains. The rank value of node x is calculated as:
where α is the random walk coefficient, and n is the total amount of nodes. We denote I (x) as the set of nodes linked to x, O (p) as the set of nodes linked from node p, and eaf (p, q) as the extended activation force from node p to q.
In (1), rank values of nodes come from two parts, propagation from relevant nodes in terms of the extended activation force and random walk from irrelevant ones. The activation force proposed by Guo et al. [24] is to weight the strength association between relevant nodes, reflecting the intrinsic characteristic of nodes in a complex network. The extended activation force that we proposed also considers topic factors of apps, such as categories and popularity, reflecting the strength of association between relevant components.
Denoted the measure of extended activation force from i to j as f ij , then f ij is given by
where g ij is the weight coefficient of category, l ij is that of download, and r ij is the metric value of activation force. Thereinto, g ij is artificially determined according to experimental statistics. We classified apps from markets into 12 categories, including payment, social, entertainment, etc.
At first, any g ij was initialized to 1.00. Since social apps are widely spread in our daily life, and payment apps are even closely related to our property security, thus, we modified the coefficients from any category to the social category into 1.005, and modified those from any category except social and payment to payment category into 1.01. Specially, we set the coefficient from social to payment as 1.05, and set that from payment to payment as 1.08.
The metric value of activation force is represented as r ij , which is given by
Here, the strength of the link from node i to node j is defined as r ij , q i is the occurrence frequency of i, q ij is the co-occurrence frequency of i and j, and d ij is the shortest distance between the two nodes in their co-occurrences. Accordingly, r ij reflects the topic-irrelevant measure of activation force from i to j in the directed graph. The weight coefficient of download is represented as l ij , which is dominated by the quantity of associated apps and the number of downloads.
where n i is the number of downloads of apps that component i belongs to, n is the total number of downloads of all apps, and ρ is the maximum amount of apps among all paths that pass though these two components. Thus, ρ ij 1. Based on (2)-(4), f ij is obtained as follows:
In fact, f ij is eaf (i, j) in (1). Obviously, more apps included in connected paths increases the value of ρ ij . As the weight of the extended activation force increases, the component gains greater rank value as shown by (1) .
The CRSPR algorithm is computed as Algorithm 1. Note that CRSPR is an iterative process. The transition matrixM is constructed based on the extended activation forces, d is the distance between adjacent iterations, and ε is the tolerance. During iteration, if d ε, it converges. Because of the extended activation force, the rank value of nodes is distributed to the following nodes considering the topic of apps during iteration.
C. COMPARE WITH PAGERANK
The rank value of each node is distributed to the successor nodes based on the extended activation forces. Fig. 3 shows the rank propagation of both CRSPR and PageRank. Fig. 3a  and 3c show the procedure of PageRank, while Fig. 3b and 3d show that of CRSPR, which considers the topic of nodes with the extended activation forces. In the PageRank calculation, the rank value of nodes is divided and distributed to the successor nodes equally. For example, in Fig. 3a , the rank value of A is 100, and the successors C and D each gain 50 from A. However, the topics of C and D may be very different, which should be assigned different importance. CRSPR improves the value propagation. As shown in Fig. 3b , the proportion of extended activation forces determines the distribution ratio of topic weights. For instance, the extended activation force from A to C is 0.3, and that from A to D is 0.5. Thus, the rank value of A is divided and distributed to C and D at a ratio of 3:5. Fig. 3b shows that D has a greater influence than C with CRSPR. Fig. 3a and 3b show the propagation of rank from one pair of nodes to another. The calculation is recursive and iterates until the computation converges. Fig. 3c and 3d show a consistent steady-state solution for a set of nodes in which node B has greater influence thanks to CRSPR.
We will compare CRSPR with the traditional PageRank algorithm in Section IV using real-world apps to show the improvement of our approach.
IV. EVALUATION A. DATASET
Our dataset consists two parts. On one hand, we downloaded released operating system images of Nexus 5 and Pixel devices from Google's image factory to extract pre-installed apps. On the other hand, we also crawled apps from Google Play and 40 alternative app markets including Baidu [25], Tencent [26] and Wandoujia [27] in China. The total number of apps in our dataset is more than 91 thousand.
Our system automatically extracts essential ICC information from apps and computes the ICC relationship across apps. Based on the ICC graph, we then compute the importance values of components and apps.
B. ICC GRAPH CONSTRUCTION
For the 91 thousand apps, we are able to extract more than 1.55 million components. After analyzing the ICC relationship of these components, we have identified 477,069 components that are associated with ICC, which belong to 58,941 apps. Then we construct the ICC graph and compare the influence of components and apps using CRSPR and PagaRank separately. 
1) ICC INTERACTION ACROSS APPS
We use the tool Gephi [28] to re-arrange the layout of components in the ICC graph with the ForceAtlas2 algorithm [29] . ForceAtlas2 is a force-directed layout algorithm for network spatialization. Fig. 5 shows part (central area) of the interaction graph that we have constructed. In Fig. 5 , each node represents a component, and the edge between two nodes means that there exists an ICC invocation. The whole graph is composed of many connected edges. We use a subgraph to represent the ICC invocations that related to a single app, and we find many subgraphs share the same common nodes. For example, app ''com.lakala.android'' (A in Fig. 5 ) share the same component ''com.lakala.android.external.PaymentLotteryActivity'' (node a in Fig. 5 ) with app ''com.qidian.QDReader _C2132495'' (B in Fig. 5 ), which means that component a is related to both app A and B. The result suggests that larger numbers of components can be accessed by other components and even apps.
We further analyzed the reasons why different apps share the same components (in addition to perform advertisement). We have actually observed three key reasons: (1) pushing messages, (2) third-party authorization, and (3) sharing resources. Pushing libraries play important roles in receiving feedback from users so as to improve user experience. Third-party authorization libraries allow users to enter a system with other social networking accounts, e.g., logging in to LinkedIn with Facebook accounts. With resources sharing libraries, apps could obtain user data from authorized apps to improve user experience, for instance, official Android Camera gets user location via Google Maps. This observations also suggested that it is reasonable to highlight influential apps based on the ICC associations of components across apps. Since the TPLs may lead to risks of ICC-induced vulnerabilities (or attacks), so here we recognize and mark the TPLs rather than directly remove them.
C. IDENTIFYING INFLUENTIAL APPS 1) TOP 10 INFLUENTIAL APPS
We sort the apps based on the metric values given in Fig. 4b and select the top 10 apps ordered by CRSPR values, as given in Table 2 . The dagger symbol ( †) indicates a social app, and the double cross symbol ( ‡) indicates a payment app.
From Table 2 , we find that 8 out of top 10 apps with CRSPR are social apps or payment apps, while only 2 of top 10 apps with the PageRank are social apps or payment apps. App ''lipan.curse'' gains the highest value with PageRank but gain a low value with CRSPR. App ''com.android.browser'' is a system browser app and it gains high value in both methods. App ''com.android.packageinstaller'' is also a system app, but the ranking diverges greatly in both methods. Thus we further detailed analyzed these three apps (as shown in Table 3 ) to explore the difference between CRSPR and PageRank.
D. FINDINGS 1) FINDING 1: THE IMPORTANCE VALUES OF APPS WITH DIRECTED CYCLIC GRAPHS ARE NOT HIGH
App ''lipan.curse'' is a fictional app and we further analyzed the ICC interaction for its components. Fig. 6a and  6b show the values with PageRank and CRSPR separately. App ''lipan.curse'' only contains one main activity (labeled as A), seven catalogue activities (labeled as B-H), and lots of other text activities. The main activity is connected with these seven catalogue activities, and each catalogue activity is connected with some text activities. Almost every text activity has three buttons: jumping to the next activities, jumping to the previous activities, and returning to the catalogue activity. Except for areas A-H, most text activities have two-way connections with the connected ones.
As shown in Fig. 6a , with PageRank, each text activity distributes ranks to other text activities and catalogue activities equally. So that, the main activity (A) and seven catalogue activities (B-H) gain small values, while the other text activities gain larger values, comparatively. On the contrary, in Fig. 6b , with CRSPR, because the main activity and catalogue activities occupy important positions, the extended activation forces between the main activity and catalogue activities should be larger than those between catalogue activities, and the forces between catalogue activities and text activities should be larger than those between text activities. Therefore, each text activity distributes more ranks to main activity and catalogue activities than to other text activities. As shown in Fig. 6b , Activity A now gains the largest value, and Activities B-H gain larger values than text activities. As a result, app ''lipan.curse'' gains a much smaller summation value with CRSPR than with PageRank. 
2) FINDING 2: NOT ALL PRE-INSTALLED SYSTEM APPS OCCUPY IMPORTANT POSITIONS
As shown in Table 3 , both ''com.android.browser'' (Browser) and ''com.android.packageinstaller'' (PackageInstaller) are pre-installed system apps, but the importance values differ greatly in our approach. We further investigated the reason. Fig. 7 shows the detailed ICC associations of app PackageInstaller and its related apps. PackageInstaller is located in the central area enclosed with a dashed circle. The surrounding nodes are components that linked to PackageInstaller. Most of the connections are in-links from other apps to PackageInstaller, but there are almost no out-links from PackageInstaller to others. As a default pre-installed system app, Browser is also the same. However, the importance values of them differ greatly. In our approach, PackageInstaller ranks 25,402 from more than 91 thousand apps, which means that almost 27.91% of total samples occupy more important positions than PackageInstaller.
The distinctions between Browser and PackageInstaller lie mainly at two points. On one hand, the number of in-links differs greatly. On the other hand, the categories of related apps differ greatly. Fig. 8 shows the importance values of predecessor apps linked to Browser and PackageInstaller respectively. It is obvious that the number of apps linked to Browser is much higher than the number of apps linked to PackageInstaller. According to our statistics, there are 3,379 predecessor apps directly linked to Browser and 537 predecessor apps directly linked to PackageInstaller.
Besides, we find that the average importance value of apps linked to app Browser is much higher than that of apps linked to PackageInstaller. Table 4 shows the top 10 predecessor apps linked to Browser and PackageInstaller ordered by the importance value. The mean value of top 10 predecessor apps of Browser is 0.2349, while that of PackageInstaller is only 0.0584. We also find that 7 out of top 10 predecessor apps of Browser are social apps or payment apps, while only one out of those of PackageInstaller is a social app. From III-B, since payment apps and social apps usually gain more rank values than apps of other categories relatively, Browser has more predecessor apps of these two categories than PackageInstaller, resulting in higher rank value of Browser than that of PackageInstaller.
Commonly popular apps usually do not install other apps, even then they conduct updates, thus app PackageInstaller do not occupy important positions in our ranking approach. Also, some other system apps, including Clock, Downloads, SIM Toolkit, share the same conditions too.
In contrast, some pre-installed system apps play important roles, including Phone, Message, Contacts, Settings. Because many popular apps collect user data through these apps to improve their user experience, or invoke some services of these apps to implement functions of themselves. For example, music apps change volume through Settings, taxi-hailing apps make calls between drivers and customers through Phone, and social apps establish friendship with data from Contacts.
3) FINDING 3: SOCIAL APPS AND PAYMENT APPS OCCUPY IMPORTANT POSITIONS
As shown in Table 2 , social apps ( †) and payment apps ( ‡) occupy important positions. On one hand, many apps use social SDKs to interact with social apps, including whatsapp, wechat, QQ, facebook, twitter, and so on. On the other hand, mobile payment and personal e-wallets get higher user engagement, different categories of apps increasingly have access to the service of payment apps, including Apple Pay, Google Wallet, Alipay and WeChat Pay.
E. IMPACT OF INFLUENTIAL APPS
Because influential apps have the potential to affect many other apps, it is necessary to pay more attention to influential apps. Once they are attacked or hijacked by malware, many innocent apps will consequently suffer from security risk or under threat. For example, vulnerabilities found in the WebView will seriously impact the whole smartphone operating system. Once Browser exposes WebView vulnerabilities, more than 3,500 apps in our experiments would suffer from risk of remote code execution, javascript injection, etc.
We have analyzed the number of directly and indirectly connected apps for the top 10 influential apps. We define the predecessor apps in this association network as directly affected apps. As the influence of apps becomes small after the distance reaches 3, we then define apps with distance less than 3 as indirectly affected apps, including the predecessor of directly affected apps and the predecessor apps of the successors. As shown in Fig. 9 , for the top 10 influential apps, they only affect a small number of apps directly, with an average number of 6.67 (excluding Browser). In contrary, they have affected large number of apps indirectly, with an average number of 1031.1.
For another instance, with the Time-of-Check to Time-ofUse vulnerability [30] uncovered in PackageInstaller, attackers could exploit this vulnerability, to hijack ordinary Android installation process and install other specified apps without user's knowledge. Our proof of concept is to hook the installation process and replace the target app with specified apps. We selected 20 apps that have invoked PackageInstallerActivity, the main activity of PackageInstaller, as our test samples. In our experiment, all of these 20 apps have installed the specified apps, which demonstrated that hackers could exploit this vulnerabilities to spread malware.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine possible limitations of our approach and discuss potential future improvements.
First, despite we have the ability to handle information from four basic types of components, obtaining data from other resources (such as shared preferences, sqlite, external files) is still a challenge because of protection means (encryption, compression, encoding, etc.), causing probable false negatives to some extent.
Second, with the escalation of security incidents, more apps are protected by encryption, obfuscation, reinforcement and many other techniques. It requires more reverseengineering efforts to tackle these issues in order to extract integrated ICC information.
Third, many developers created more than one apps (e.g., Baidu has released several dozens of apps), privacy data could be shared among these apps explicitly or implicitly. Although it is interesting to assess the importance of a single app, the influence of each developer is also worth studying.
Finally, our dataset only contains 91 thousand apps, it might be interesting to see the results when expanding our approach to millions of apps.
VI. RELATED WORK A. ICC-BASED SECURITY ISSUES
Since components of Android apps can be accessed explicitly or implicitly, many security and privacy issues have been published, including privilege escalation attacks [6] , [31] - [35] , sensitive data theft [31] , [35] , [36] and malicious data access [37] , [38] .
Felt et al. [32] discussed permission re-delegation, demonstrated the risks by launching real-world attacks on Android apps, and confirmed several vulnerabilities. Enck et al. [36] studied a breadth of security properties in a large set of popular Android apps, and fount many intent vulnerabilities including Intent injection. Chan et al. [33] found that when a vulnerable app is leveraged, other apps may gain extra capabilities which they are not granted originally. Grace et al. [34] found that several privileged permissions are unsafely exposed to other apps which do not need to request them for the actual use, and developed a tool called Woodpecker to identify these leaked permissions or capabilities. Chin et al. [31] found that the content of messages passing inter-apps can be sniffed, modified, stolen, or replaced, which can compromise user privacy, leading to breaches of user data and violate app security policies. Lu et al. [6] studied the component hijacking vulnerabilities in Android apps. As noted by Hoog et al. [35] , leakages and exploits have been the real threats to mobile platforms nowadays, more than 50% of which are connected to privacy leakage, and 48% of which is related to vulnerabilities and defects. Zhou et al. [37] found that because of the lack of necessary access control enforcement, affected apps can be exploited to either passively disclose private data, or inadvertently manipulate certain security-sensitive settings that may cause serious system-wide side effects.
B. ICC-BASED STATIC ANALYSIS
Traditional analysis techniques are not effective at tracking control and data flows across components and apps. Therefore, ICC-aware static approaches have been studied extensively in recent years. Numerous tools [11] - [15] , [39] - [45] have been developed and applied on ICC analysis.
Octeau et al. [42] proposed a static analysis approach to extract ICC-related meta informations. Feng et al. [41] introduced Apposcopy to infer Intent values, similarly to Epicc. Kleiber et al. [13] combined these two ideas, and developed a method of Android taint flow analysis for app sets. Ravitch et al. [43] presented a multiple-app information flow analysis tool called FUSE to detect information flows that violate specified security policies. Li et al. [15] improved the precision of the ICC analysis by propagating context information between components with a tool-based approach named IccTA. Octeau et al. [11] presented an improved tool version of epicc called IC3, to solve the multi-valued composite constant propagation (MVC) problem in order to infer ICC values. After that, Octeau et al. [12] proposed a probabilistic model to further improve the extraction of ICC-related meta information.
These aforementioned related work provide promising approaches to analyze multiple apps for interactive behaviors, for example, by calculating potential associations between components of restricted app sets.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel app ranking approach based on the interaction relationship of Android apps. More specially, we first improved the accuracy of ICC analysis and constructed an ICC graph for a large mount of apps. Then, we proposed a topic-sensitive influence assessing algorithm and applied it to the constructed ICC graph for pinpointing influential apps. By analyzing more than 91 thousand apps, experimental results suggest that CRSPR could accurate identify influential apps and these apps should be paid more attention. 
